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The “Warm Glow” theory of worker motivation in nonprofit organisations predicts 
that wages will be lower in the voluntary sector than for equivalent workers in the 
private and public sectors.  Empirical findings, however, are mixed. Focussing on the 
Health & Social Work industries, we examine differences in levels of unpaid overtime 
between the sectors to test for the existence of a warm-glow effect.  Although levels of 
unpaid overtime are significantly higher in voluntary sector, we find that this is 
insufficient to explain the wage premiums earned in this sector. 3 
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Introduction 
Comparisons of the differing characteristics of the private and public sectors have a 
long history in both theoretical and empirical literatures.  However, there is a 
relatively small but growing third sector, made up of charities, voluntary organisations 
and other nonprofits, that demands further research interest.  In the UK in 2005/06 the 
voluntary sector had an income of £31 billion (National Council of Voluntary 
Organisations, 2008) which makes up about 2.5% of GDP. 
One of the areas in which voluntary organisations may differ from private and public 
organisations is their behaviour in the labour market.  How do voluntary organisations 
set wages for their workers, and is employment in this sector different from the other 
sectors?  With an increasing number of social care services contracted out by 
government to nonprofit organisations, understanding key components of the costs 
involved, such as labour, is critical.  “Warm Glow” theories of nonprofit organisations 
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predict that we should expect wages to be lower than in the other sectors, but 
relatively little empirical work has been carried out to investigate this issue, 
particularly outside the USA. 
The biggest challenge in analysing the voluntary sector is the availability of data, 
particularly as the sector currently accounts for only 4% of the UK workforce.  For 
over ten years now the UK Labour Force Survey has asked respondents which sector 
their employer operates in, and this is sufficient to identify voluntary organisations.  
Despite the relatively small proportion of voluntary sector workers, it is now possible 
to assemble a sufficiently large sample to investigate many questions about voluntary 
sector employment even at the detailed industry level. 
This paper uses ten years of pooled cross-sectional data from the UK Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) in order to examine levels of unpaid overtime at a 
disaggregated industry level in industries where voluntary sector concentration is 
relatively high.  We focus on the Health & Social Work industries for two reasons: 
firstly, to reduce the unobserved heterogeneity between organisations and jobs by 
narrowing the activities undertaken; secondly, to examine the caring industries where 
theory predicts that warm glow should be strongest. 
We begin by examining whether there are significant levels of “donated labour” 
observed in the voluntary sector.  Next, we test whether donated labour explains the 
voluntary sector wage premium found in the caring industries.  Evidence is found of 
donated labour through significantly higher levels of unpaid overtime for voluntary 
sector workers at all industry detail levels.  Wage equations are estimated with wages 
adjusted for these additional hours of unpaid work.  Although the voluntary sector 
wage premium is reduced it is still positive, and does not provide support for the 
warm-glow theory of nonprofit wage-setting.  
Empirical Literature on Sectoral Differentials and Donated Labour 
There is an extensive literature on the apparent wage premium earned by workers in 
the public sectors (see Bender (1998) for a review).  The stylised facts from this 
literature are that there is a public sector premium, it is greatest for women and 
minorities, but it has generally been decreasing over time.  Disney & Gosling (1998) 
used the General Household Survey (GHS) and British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) to estimate the public sector premium in the UK after taking worker 
characteristics into account.  They found that for men the premium fell from 5% in 
1983 to only 1% by the mid-1990’s.  However, for women the public sector premium 
increased over the same period from 11% to 14%.  
Relatively little empirical work has been done where the voluntary sector is examined 
separately as a third sector.  There has been some past research attempting to estimate 
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nonprofit or voluntary sector wage differences as a measure of warm glow, primarily 
using US data.  Weisbrod (1983) examined wage differences between lawyers 
employed by nonprofit and for-profit firms, and found evidence of a nonprofit wage 
discount of ~20%.  His analysis of a job choice equation suggested that lawyers in the 
nonprofit sector held different preferences to those employed in the private sector. 
Preston (1989) conducted an analysis of the nonprofit sector wage differential for 
white-collar workers using Current Population Survey (CPS) in the US, and found a 
significant nonprofit sector discount of 18% even after controlling for differences in 
human capital and other worker and job characteristics.  She found a larger 
differential for male workers than female workers.  It is suggested that a selectivity 
bias might be present, and this is tested for using a two-stage sector choice model, and 
also analysing a limited sector switching model. She concludes that a “donative 
labour” hypothesis is supported by the findings, but that the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity in worker characteristics that might affect their productivity has not 
been completely ruled out.    
Leete (2001) used US census data for 1990 and found little evidence of a difference 
between the private and voluntary sectors overall.  However, she did find some 
significant differences at the disaggregated industry level.  Although the industry 
categories used in Leete’s paper differ from those in the UK LFS, it is possible to 
identify some that are relevant to the industry classifications examined in this paper. 
Industry 
Nonprofit Premiums 
(t-statistic) 
% Nonprofit 
(Sample Size) 
Nursing & Personal Care Facilities 
2.22% 
(3.5) 
19.40% 
(60,120) 
Hospitals 
5.02% 
(18.87) 
43.70% 
(171,612) 
Day-care services 
6.72% 
(6.54) 
35.40% 
(21,505) 
Figure 1 – Estimated Nonprofit Wage Premiums from US Census 1990 
(Source: (Leete, 2001) 
Figure 1 shows that Leete found significant nonprofit sector premiums of between 
2.2% - 6.7% in caring industries in the US.  The table also shows that these were in 
industries with a relatively high concentration of nonprofit organisations.  Examining 
similar sectors, Mocan & Tekin (2003) used employer-employee matched data on 
child care workers in the USA, and found evidence of a nonprofit wage premium of 
between 6% - 15%. 
Ruhm & Borkoski (2003) undertake both a cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis 
of nonprofit compensation using the 1994-88 Current Population Survey Outgoing 
Rotation Groups.  They find little evidence of wage differentials, with industry and 
worker heterogeneity playing a larger role.  They conclude that nonprofit wages are 
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set primarily by competitive markets, with little evidence of donated labour observed 
in wages. 
These papers produce contradictory results – two provide evidence of a nonprofit 
wage discount, while the others support a wage premium in the health and care 
industries where most nonprofits operate.  Little work has been done to analyse 
equivalent wage differentials in a three sector model using UK data.  This paper 
examines unpaid overtime and wage differences at the industry level to examine 
whether this discount stands up to disaggregation, or whether a wage premium is 
found instead as per Leete. 
Theoretical Explanations for Voluntary Sector Donated Labour 
The term “warm glow” was used by Andreoni (1990) to describe the utility received 
by a donor from the act of giving, rather than the outcome itself.  It was proposed as a 
solution to the low levels of free-riding observed in charitable contributions, and the 
apparent absence of a crowding-out effect on private contributions when public 
contributions to nonprofit organisations are increased.  A similar concept was then 
extended to ideological entrepreneurs (Rose-Ackerman, 1997) to describe the decision 
of an entrepreneur to start a voluntary organisation. Frey (1997) suggests that 
‘intrinsic motivation’ to carry out some tasks can be crowded out by financial 
compensation and reward structures, leading to higher effort at lower pay in some 
situations.  More recently, the warm-glow concept was extended to the principal-agent 
framework (Besley & Ghatak, 2005) to explain matching between motivated 
principals and agents in the labour market.  This formalised the predicted warm-glow 
effect on wages in the voluntary sector.  As has been discussed above, the empirical 
findings have been mixed in their support for this theory. 
The literature on unpaid overtime (see (Bell & Hart, 1999)) suggests an alternative 
outlet for warm-glow effects.  Workers can adjust their effective wage by working 
additional hours of unpaid overtime.  Workers who receive a warm glow from their 
work could engage in unpaid overtime, which would lower their effective salary, 
whilst apparently receiving the same compensation as other workers.  Alternatively 
unpaid overtime can form part of an implicit bargain between worker and employer, 
where additional hours of unpaid overtime are expected and compensation is paid 
through a higher hourly wage for the “official” paid hours of work. 
Bell & Hart suggest a method of controlling for those, by calculating an adjusted 
wage which is then used as the explanatory variable in a wage equation.  First, we test 
for the existence of a sector difference in unpaid overtime.  Second, we test its impact 
in an adjusted-wage equation on the warm-glow sector difference. 
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The Dataset 
This paper uses the UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey (UK LFS) between 1998 and 
2007 to create a pooled cross-section dataset with a large enough voluntary sector 
sample size to permit detailed analysis.  The UK LFS is a quarterly rotating panel 
survey of 60,000 households per year in the UK, conducted on a random sample and 
carried out by the UK Office of National Statistics (ONS).  Each household is 
followed for one year, with five quarterly observations, collecting a wide range of 
data on wages, job characteristics, education, employers and household make-up. 
In order to remove some of the unobserved heterogeneity between jobs this paper 
estimates sector wage equations at three detailed industry levels, coded using the UK 
Standard Industrial Classification Of Economic Activities (SIC(92)).4  The industry 
classifications analysed are: 
 SIC(92) N 85.31 Social Work Activities with Accommodation 
 SIC(92) N 85.3 Social Work Activities 
 SIC(92) N 85 Health & Social Work 
As the Industry Classification gets more detailed, the sample size decreases, but 
greater restrictions are placed on the activities of the organisations within the 
classification.  The results at these three levels are presented and compared in order 
for a detailed picture of voluntary sector employment to be built up. 
SIC(92) 85.31 Social Work Activities with Accommodation 
This most-detailed classification includes: 
 activities provided on a round-the-clock basis directed to provide social 
assistance to children, the aged and special categories of persons with some 
limits on ability for self-care, but where medical treatment or education are not 
important elements: 
 activities provided by orphanages, children's boarding homes and hostels, 
residential nurseries, homes for the aged, homes for the physically or mentally 
handicapped, rehabilitation homes (without medical treatment) for people 
addicted to drugs or alcohol, homes for the homeless, institutions that take 
care of unmarried mothers and their children, etc. 
SIC(92) 85.3 Social Work Activities 
This classification includes the Social Work Activities With Accommodation detailed 
above, plus Social Work Activities Without Accommodation: Social, counselling, 
welfare, refugee, referral and similar activities, welfare and guidance activities for 
                                                 
4 SIC(92) is a hierarchical 5-digit Industry Classifications code that conforms with and corresponds 
directly to the European Community Classification of Economic Activities (NACE) Version 1 codes 
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children and adolescents, day care activities for handicapped adults, day facilities for 
homeless and other socially weak groups, and more. 
SIC(92) 85 Health & Social Work 
This broad industry classification includes: 
 Human health activities: Hospitals, Nursing Homes, Dental practices, 
opticians, etc. 
 Veterinary activities: Vets and veterinary hospitals 
 Social work activities: Social work services with and without accommodation, 
as detailed above 
Exploring a Three Sector Workforce 
Since the mid-1990’s the questions asked in the LFS allow the identification of 
organisations which operate in the Voluntary sector, permitting an analysis of a three 
sector model.5 
Although the voluntary sector as a whole accounts for only around 4% of the UK 
workforce, 60% of the sector operates within the industry classification SIC(92) “85 
Health & Social Work”.  In contrast, 29% of the Public Sector and 5% of the Private 
Sector is engaged within this industry classification.  Figure 2 below shows the 
sample sizes by sector for each of the three levels of industry classification.  It shows 
that although the voluntary sector makes up significantly more of the industry than the 
2%, the private and public sectors are both major players within each category. 
SIC(92) 85 Health & Social 
Work 
 85.3 Social Work 
Activities 
 85.31 Social Work Activities 
with Accommodation 
Sector Freq Percent  Freq Percent  Freq Percent 
Private 9,061 26.1%   4,845 36.1%  2,801 58.3% 
Public 21,850 62.9%   5,163 38.5%  1,420 29.5% 
Voluntary 3,842 11.1%   3,403 25.4%  585 12.2% 
                
Total 34,753     13,411    4,806   
Figure 2 –Sample by Sector and SIC(92) 
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
Estimating Working Hours Equations 
The average total weekly number of hours worked, including paid and unpaid 
overtime, is shown in Figure 3 below by sector and industry.  Although the figures are 
broadly similar, is does appear that in the more detailed industry classifications the 
number of hours worked by those in the voluntary sector is slightly higher. 
                                                 
5 See Appendix One for more detail on sector classifications in the UK LFS 
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Figure 3 – Average Total Weekly Hours by Sector and Industry  
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007) 
In order to investigate this, working hours equations (Bell & Hart, 1999) were 
estimated to attempt to explain the observed unpaid overtime.  These Tobit equations 
were estimated on a range of explanatory variables for each industry level in order to 
compare the outcome. 
hoursuo CONS EDUC EDUC EDUC EMPL  INDV INDV  TIMETIME  PUBSPUBS  VOLSVOLS   
Where: 
CONS  Constant Term 
EDUC  Education variables (level of highest qualification held) 
EMPL Characteristics of jobs e.g. organisation size, FT/PT, 
permanent/temporary, length of tenure 
INDV  Characteristics of the workers e.g. age, experience 
TIME  Time Dummies for year and quarter 
PUBS  Sector Dummy for Public Sector workers 
VOLS  Sector Dummy for Voluntary Sector workers 
The coefficients on the sector dummies for the public and voluntary sector relative to 
the private sector are shown below in Figure 4. 
These estimates suggest that male workers work slightly more unpaid overtime in the 
voluntary sector than the private at 1 to 2 hours per week.  This is significant for the 
two broader industry classifications, but not at the most detailed industry level.  It 
should be noted however that the number of male workers in this detailed 
classification is very small.  We find that female workers work an extra 2.25 to 2.7 
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hours of weekly unpaid overtime in the voluntary sector and this is significant at all 
three industry levels.   
These results appear to support a donated labour theory – workers in the voluntary 
sector are providing additional hours of work unpaid, compared to those in the private 
sector.  To what extent can this be seen as evidence of a “warm glow”? 
The literature on unpaid overtime offers an alternative explanation.  Workers can use 
additional hours of unpaid work to adjust rigid wage contracts.  Workers need only 
care about the number of hours they work, and the total that they get paid, and not 
about exactly how this is recorded.  A contract with a low wage and fixed hours could 
be equivalent to a contract with a higher wage, but where additional hours unpaid are 
an implicit part of the contract.  As voluntary sector workers in the HSW industries 
are paid a premium, this could in part be explained by the additional hours worked 
unpaid.  Is there still a sector difference after accounting for these additional hours? 
This can be tested by calculating an “Adjusted” hourly wage for each worker based on 
the wage per actual hour worked.  Calculating this wage for each worker and then 
using it as the dependent variable in the wage equations will provide a test for the 
presence of a “warm glow” through additional unpaid hours a drop in the estimated 
sector premium if these hours are unrewarded through basic pay. 
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 Male 
Workers 
  Female 
Workers 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 85: 
Health & SW 
85.3:
Social Work 
85.31:
Soc. Work w. 
Accomm’n 
85:
Health & SW 
85.3: 
Social Work 
85.31:
Soc. Work w.  
Accomm’n 
       
Public Sector -0.687 0.297 -0.100 0.833 0.881 1.540 
 (0.505) (0.666) (1.465) (0.153)*** (0.270)*** (0.491)*** 
       
Voluntary  1.997 1.419 2.175 2.713 2.535 2.258 
Sector (0.614)*** (0.661)** (1.452) (0.208)*** (0.294)*** (0.635)*** 
       
Years  0.135 0.0872 0.276 0.156 0.165 0.286 
Experience (0.0561)** (0.0848) (0.222) (0.0203)*** (0.0373)*** (0.0763)*** 
       
Years 
Experience  
-0.00102 -0.000581 -0.00248 -0.00196 -0.00210 -0.00403 
Squared (0.00117) (0.00171) (0.00433) (0.000432)*** (0.000772)*** (0.00151)*** 
       
Married 0.311 1.900 0.570 0.429 0.563 0.662 
 (0.391) (0.548)*** (1.350) (0.125)*** (0.226)** (0.466) 
       
Part-time Work -3.447 -3.290 -6.194 -9.813 -9.843 -9.743 
 (0.745)*** (0.809)*** (2.408)** (0.540)*** (0.847)*** (1.311)*** 
       
Org. Size: 1-10  0.856 -0.0517 -1.730 1.166 1.085 1.050 
emp. (0.571) (0.664) (1.848) (0.170)*** (0.295)*** (0.696) 
       
Org. Size: 11-24  -0.982 -1.151 -2.563 -0.342 -0.819 -0.380 
emp. (0.491)** (0.626)* (1.645) (0.167)** (0.298)*** (0.612) 
       
Org. Size: 25-49  -0.952 -0.365 -1.343 0.0975 -0.281 -0.387 
emp. (0.524)* (0.681) (1.775) (0.172) (0.309) (0.606) 
       
_cons 1.633 1.736 0.231 -0.285 -0.0722 -1.752 
 (1.323) (1.825) (4.326) (0.629) (1.021) (1.982) 
sigma       
_cons 8.488 6.978 8.647 5.940 6.554 7.377 
 (0.148)*** (0.198)*** (0.548)*** (0.0174)*** (0.0499)*** (0.236)*** 
N 3,859 1,206 411 15,156 5,556 2,189 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(Also included: Education, Occupation, Temporary Job, No. Children, Disability) 
 
Figure 4 - Hours of Unpaid Overtime for Male and Female Workers  
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Estimating the Wage Equations 
In Figure 5 below the sector average hourly wages can be seen in each of the three 
samples. 
In all three industries the public sector wages are the highest, followed by the 
voluntary sector, and with wages in the private sector lowest.  There appears to be a 
significant gap between the private sector wages and the other two sectors, while the 
public and voluntary sector wages seem broadly similar. 
Although this does not take account of differences in individuals’ characteristics, such 
as age, education and experience, this suggests that there may be a voluntary sector 
premium paid to workers in this sector when compared to the private sector. 
Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals, employers and jobs is 
a recurring issue facing the estimation of wage differentials.  Are observed sector 
wage differences explained by differences between organisational form, or sector 
selection by workers?  We control for the former by restricting the sample to detailed 
industry classifications to allow comparison between similar job activities and roles.  
This reduction to more detailed job classification comes at a cost of reduced sample 
size.   
The effect of the additional unpaid overtime was estimated using standard Mincer 
Wage Equations (see (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2006) for a review).  Separate 
equations were estimated for male and female workers, regressing log hourly pay on a 
range of explanatory variables with sector dummies for the public and voluntary 
sectors, for each of the three samples. 
  VOLSPUBSTIMEINDVEMPLEDUCCONSwage VOLSPUBSTIMEINDVEMPLEDUC)ln(  
In order to correct for potential selectivity bias due to non-participation (Heckman, 
1979) a sample selection equation was estimated jointly with the wage equations.  
This probit model of labour force participation included age, marital status current 
study, and disability as independent variables.  With the exception of age, these 
variables were chosen as having an effect on the decision to enter the workforce, but 
not to directly affect the wage earned. 
  
 
Figure 5 - Average Gross Hourly Pay by Sector & Industry between 1998 – 2007 
(Source: UK Quarterly Labour Force Survey 1998 – 2007)
The adjusted hourly wage, taking account of unpaid overtime, is calculated as 
follows: 
)(
...
uopob
pohbh
a hhh
hwhw
w 
    
Where wa is the Adjusted Hourly Wage, wh is the contracted hourly wage, hb is the 
contracted basic hours per week, hpo is the number of hours of paid overtime, huo is 
the number of hours unpaid overtime, and  is the premium paid for overtime 
working.  As the Labour Force Survey does not provide data on wages for paid 
overtime an average premium of π=1.28 was used as per the findings of Bell & Hart 
(2003) from the British New Earnings Survey. 
The adjusted wage was calculated, and the Mincer wage equations estimated, along 
with the sample selection equations.  The wage equation coefficient estimates for the 
Male and Female workers are shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7 below. 
We find evidence of significant wage differences between the sectors, but the cross-
sectional analysis does not allow this estimate to be apportioned between unobserved 
worker heterogeneity and sector compensating differentials.  However, this is in line 
with the methodology of previous empirical studies providing evidence for ‘warm 
glow’ effects, and this paper shows that the wage-setting behaviour underlying sector 
wage differences is more complicated than that predicted by a ‘warm glow’ 
explanation. 
It can be seen that at all three industry levels a significant wage premium was found 
for both the public and voluntary sectors after accounting for observed individual 
differences, with the exception of male workers in the broadest industry classification. 
 
 
Male Basic Hourly Pay Adjusted Log Hourly Pay 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 85: 
Health & SW 
85.3:
Social Work 
85.31:
Soc. Work w. 
Accomm’n 
85:
Health & SW 
85.3: 
Social Work 
85.31:
Soc. Work w.  
Accomm’n 
       
Public Sector 0.0775 0.165 0.198 0.0928 0.178 0.197 
 (0.0152)*** (0.0238)*** (0.0387)*** (0.0160)*** (0.0250)*** (0.0406)*** 
       
Voluntary  0.0317 0.115 0.115 0.0250 0.105 0.0899 
Sector (0.0189)* (0.0240)*** (0.0425)*** (0.0198) (0.0252)*** (0.0449)** 
       
Years  -0.0104 -0.0160 -0.321 -0.0111 -0.0164 -0.0132 
Experience (0.00162)*** (0.00258)*** (0.136)** (0.00170)*** (0.00271)*** (0.00458)*** 
       
Experience  0.000180 0.000295 -0.0131 0.000193 0.000300 0.000199 
Squared (0.0000314)*** (0.0000485)*** (0.00437)*** (0.0000331)*** (0.0000510)*** (0.0000828)** 
       
No. Months  0.000302 0.000276 0.000393 0.000158 0.000333 0.000765 
Tenure (0.000164)* (0.000323) (0.000637) (0.000173) (0.000340) (0.000669) 
       
Part-time 0.0741 0.0292 0.0963 0.0522 0.0242 0.0958 
 (0.0183)*** (0.0251) (0.0465)** (0.0192)*** (0.0263) (0.0489)* 
       
Org. Size: 1-10  0.146 0.122 0.171 0.161 0.134 0.205 
emp. (0.0180)*** (0.0245)*** (0.0490)*** (0.0189)*** (0.0258)*** (0.0515)*** 
       
Org. Size: 11-24  0.0685 0.0672 0.0979 0.0815 0.0784 0.135 
emp. (0.0161)*** (0.0240)*** (0.0446)** (0.0169)*** (0.0253)*** (0.0468)*** 
       
Org. Size: 25-49  0.0140 0.000800 -0.00841 0.0194 0.00895 0.0229 
emp. (0.0165) (0.0255) (0.0466) (0.0174) (0.0268) (0.0489) 
       
Temporary Job 0.0128 -0.0427 -0.0543 0.000961 -0.0662 -0.0205 
 (0.0217) (0.0341) (0.0681) (0.0228) (0.0357)* (0.0717) 
       
_cons 2.156 2.158 2.161 2.074 2.075 2.079 
 (0.0112)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0110)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0116)*** 
       
N (Industry) 5,614 2,082 665 5,614 2,082 665 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(also controlled for: Education, Occupation, Tenure Squared.  Heckman Selection equation uses age, 
marital status, no. children, disability, current study) 
Figure 6 – Estimated Sector Wage Differences for Male Workers 
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Female Basic Hourly Pay Adjusted Log Hourly Pay 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 85: 
Health & SW 
85.3:
Social Work 
85.31:
Soc. Work w. 
Accomm’n 
85:
Health & SW 
85.3: 
Social Work 
85.31:
Soc. Work w.  
Accomm’n 
       
Public Sector 0.122 0.196 0.228 0.120 0.190 0.226 
 (0.00581)*** (0.00908)*** (0.0144)*** (0.00616)*** (0.00962)*** (0.0153)*** 
       
Voluntary  0.0920 0.153 0.137 0.0749 0.141 0.120 
Sector (0.00826)*** (0.0103)*** (0.0201)*** (0.00876)*** (0.0109)*** (0.0212)*** 
       
Years  -0.00535 -0.00448 0.000156 -0.00560 -0.00366 -0.00563 
Experience (0.000792)*** (0.00113)*** (0.0000338)*** (0.000837)*** (0.00119)*** (0.00189)*** 
       
Experience  0.000108 0.000107 -0.00690 0.000111 0.0000891 0.000117 
Squared (0.0000158)*** (0.0000223)*** (0.0504) (0.0000167)*** (0.0000235)*** (0.0000357)*** 
       
No. Months  0.000197 -0.000156 5.42e-08 0.000215 -0.000111 -0.000198 
Tenure (0.0000813)** (0.000136) (0.000000733) (0.0000863)** (0.000144) (0.000233) 
       
Part-time 0.0605 0.0110 0.120 0.0494 0.00164 0.0372 
 (0.00539)*** (0.00792) (0.0207)*** (0.00572)*** (0.00838) (0.0134)*** 
       
Org. Size: 1-10  0.0961 0.0463 0.0571 0.0879 0.0281 0.120 
emp. (0.00761)*** (0.0108)*** (0.0173)*** (0.00805)*** (0.0115)** (0.0219)*** 
       
Org. Size: 11-24  0.0557 0.0274 0.0372 0.0685 0.0433 0.0687 
emp. (0.00732)*** (0.0106)** (0.0172)** (0.00777)*** (0.0113)*** (0.0184)*** 
       
Org. Size: 25-49  0.0367 0.0194 0.00345 0.0537 0.0426 0.0566 
emp. (0.00760)*** (0.0111)* (0.0350) (0.00807)*** (0.0118)*** (0.0183)*** 
       
Temporary Job 0.0408 0.0461 0.0243 0.0317 0.0194 -0.0821 
 (0.0118)*** (0.0166)*** (0.0171) (0.0124)** (0.0174) (0.0363)** 
       
_cons 1.920 1.914 1.913 1.853 1.849 1.848 
 (0.0131)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0139)*** (0.0132)*** (0.0129)*** 
       
N (Industry) 25,680 10,062 3,652 25,680 10,062 3,652 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
(also controlled for: Education, Occupation, Tenure Squared.  Heckman Selection equation uses age, 
marital status, no. children, disability, current study) 
Figure 7 – Estimated Sector Wage Differences for Female Workers
A comparison of the wage premiums from the Basic Wage and Adjusted Wage 
models for male workers is shown in Figure 8.  The sector coefficients βVOLS and βPUB 
have been converted from log coefficients to percentages using the equation below as 
per Halvorsen & Palmqvist (1980). 
1 VOLSepercentVOLS   
The Unpaid Hours equations above found little evidence of additional unpaid hours of 
overtime for male workers in the voluntary sector, and so we would expect to find 
little difference between estimated in the Adjusted and Basic wage equations. 
Industry Sector Basic
Wage Premium 
Adjusted 
Wage Premium Difference 
Health & S.W. Public 8.06% 9.72% 1.66% 
 Voluntary 3.22% 2.53% -0.69% 
     
Social Work Industry Public 17.94% 19.48% 1.54% 
 Voluntary 12.19% 11.07% -1.12% 
     
S.W. Accommodation Public 21.90% 21.77% -0.13% 
 Voluntary 12.19% 9.41% -2.78% 
Figure 8 – Differences in Sector Premiums for Male Workers 
The voluntary sector premium is still insignificant in the broad Health & Social Work 
industry, and has decreased by about 1% in the Social Work Activities industry.  
Surprisingly, in the narrowest Social Work Accommodation industry the premium has 
fallen by nearly 3%.  However, this is a reduction in the premium of less than a 
quarter.  This does not support a strong ‘warm glow’ effect from unpaid overtime for 
male workers, consistent with the finding of little or no additional unpaid overtime in 
the sector. 
A comparison of the wage premiums from the Basic Wage and Adjusted Wage 
models for female workers is shown below in Figure 9. 
Industry Sector Basic
Wage Premium 
Adjusted 
Wage Premium Difference 
Health & S.W. Public 12.98% 12.75% -0.23% 
 Voluntary 9.64% 7.78% -1.86% 
     
Social Work Industry Public 21.65% 20.92% -0.73% 
 Voluntary 16.53% 15.14% -1.39% 
     
S.W. Accommodation Public 25.61% 25.36% -0.25% 
 Voluntary 14.68% 12.75% -1.93% 
Figure 9 – Differences in Sector Premiums for Female Workers 
For female workers the voluntary sector premium has decreased slightly across all the 
industry classifications.  The biggest change is in the Social Work Accommodation 
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industry where the premium has fallen by nearly 2%.  This does not support a “warm 
glow” explanation for the additional unpaid hours, as the size of this effect is very 
small compared with the broader sector premium in these industries. 
Overall, there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that the additional unpaid 
hours indicate a voluntary sector ‘warm glow’ effect. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined overtime and wage data from the UK Labour Force Survey 
disaggregated by Industry to examine sector differentials within Health and Social 
Work services where the majority of voluntary sector workers are employed.  The 
empirical analysis found strong evidence of higher levels of unpaid overtime amongst 
voluntary sector workers, particularly for females.  The basic hours wage equations 
showed a premium at all three industry levels for both male and female workers.  This 
is broadly in line with the findings of Leete ( 2001) using US data.   
These findings are robust despite some sector differences in working hours, tested by 
estimating adjusted wage equations.  Although additional unpaid overtime in the 
voluntary sector does partly reduce the sector effect for both male and female 
workers, a significant premium still remains. 
Although there is evidence of greater unpaid overtime, the continued existence of 
wage premiums means that these additional hours are compensated for.  Therefore 
these findings do not support the predictions of the warm-glow theories for voluntary 
sector wage-setting.  Before discussing the implications, we consider two caveats for 
the results: sample selection and product markets. 
This study is carried out in the cross-section, and so is not able to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity associated with sector selection.  However, to support a 
warm-glow theory with these findings it would be necessary to suppose that voluntary 
sector workers were more productive due to unobserved characteristics by more than 
8% to 15%. 
It is also not possible to control for unobserved characteristics of job quality using 
employee data.  If there are systematic differences by sector in the levels of effort 
required or the stress involved in doing the job, then these could account for the wage 
differential.  This is plausible if there is significant “cream-skimming” behaviour by 
private firms in the product market.  For example, a private firm running a care home 
looking to maximise profits may select to admit residents who will be easy and low-
cost to care for.  Motivated organisations in the voluntary sector, who gain warm glow 
from their work, may select more difficult or costly residents.  This could result in a 
very different experience for workers on the “front-line”.  Again, given the size of the 
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wage premiums, this effect would need to be significant if a warm-glow effect on 
wages is again to be supported. 
Is a finding of wage premiums incompatible with the warm-glow theory?  Voluntary 
Sector organisations are bound by a non-distribution constraint that limits what can be 
done with profits.  If a voluntary organisation makes a surplus on its operation it faces 
a choice: 
 Increase quantity of output i.e. beyond Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost 
 Increase quality of output i.e. provide a “Rolls-Royce” service 
 Decrease (subsidise) price of product for users  
 Increase wages paid to workers (share rents with staff) 
A motivated worker would gain a warm glow from the first three actions, although 
they may also suffer from intensified work.  Motivated and unmotivated workers 
would receive utility from the last action.  Without an understanding of the product 
market for the voluntary organisation it is difficult to distinguish between higher 
wages as a result of rent extraction, as opposed to higher wages stemming from more 
intensive work conditions to provide greater output or levels of quality. 
The absence of a warm-glow effect in the industries where it could be expected to 
most important – the caring industries – provides a significant challenge to theories of 
warm-glow motivation in employment contracts.  Although successful in explaining 
both charitable donations and volunteering behaviour, this paper argues primarily that 
a warm glow theory of wage-setting in the voluntary sector is insufficient to explain 
the labour market outcomes observed.  While motivation may well play a part in 
organisations in this sector, the empirical evidence does not provide a clear picture, 
and there is a need to develop a better understanding of the factors driving the 
behaviour of voluntary organisations and their employees. 
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Appendix One – Variable Descriptions 
This Appendix explains in more detail the definition and construction of the key 
variables from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) as used in this paper. 
Identifying Organisations’ Sector 
Private Sector 
The Private Sector includes Public limited companies (PLC), Limited companies 
(Ltd), and small businesses often owned by one or more individuals. It also includes 
self-employed individuals; sole traders, or owners of small shops or businesses. 
Public Sector 
The Public Sector includes any employer that is owned, funded or run by central or 
local government 
Voluntary Sector 
The Voluntary Sector includes charities, private trusts, housing associations, trade 
unions, private schools that are registered as charities and other voluntary 
organisations.  In terms of the LFS, they are any employer coded with the LFS 
variable SECTRO03 coded “7” 
Regression Equation Variables 
These tables contain the LFS names for the variables used in the regressions, and 
details of the variables derived from LFS variables.  
LFS Variable Name Description 
HIQUAL Dummy variables for level of highest qualification held, split by National Vocational 
Qualification (NVQ) level 
EMPMON No. of months with current employer 
SOCMAJM Major Occupation Category 
PTFT Part-time / Fulltime 
JOBTYP Permanent / Temporary 
DISCURR Disability status 
QULNOW Respondee is currently studying for a qualification 
INDSECT SIC(92) Industry Classification 
HOURPAY Gross Hourly Wage 
BUSHR Basic Usual Weekly Hours 
OTTHR Overtime Usual Weekly Hours 
 
Derived variables Description and Source Variables 
EXPER AGE minus EDAGE (age at which completed fulltime education) 
ORGSIZE Recode of MPNOR 
MARRIED Recode of MARSTAT and MARSTATA (marital status) 
NUMCHILD Recode of FDPCH19 (number of dependent children in household) 
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